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Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have long provided credit ratings for investors, regulators, 
and financial institutions as an indicator to assess firms’ credit risk and to determine regulatory 
capital requirements. However, CRAs have suffered significant reputational damage following 
their well-publicized failures to recognize the risks of structured securities in the lead up to the 
2008-2009 global financial crisis. Their overly optimistic assessment of mortgage-related 
securities helped to fuel mortgage debt finance, increased risk taking by financial institutions and 
significantly contributed to the financial crisis.1 In direct response to the financial crisis, in July 
2010, the U.S. Congress strengthened the regulation of the financial services industry with the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). 
Dodd-Frank established greater oversight of CRAs, in particular, increased legal and regulatory 
penalties for issuing inaccurate ratings (Section 932 and 933) and reduced the regulatory reliance 
on credit ratings (Section 939). In this paper, we examine how the passage of Dodd-Frank in 
reforming the financial architecture has changed the demand for and the information content of 
multiple credit ratings. 
The extant literature finds that while multiple ratings may be acquired for numerous 
reasons, regulatory certification is the most common (see, for example, Bongaerts, Cremers and 
Goetzmann, 2012; Chen and Wang, 2017). Investors generally only require one or at most two 
ratings, but issuers frequently obtain multiple ratings (Baker and Mansi, 2002). Most large U.S. 
corporate bonds are rated by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P), with the lower rating 
                                                          
1 Between 2000 and 2007, Moody’s rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securities as AAA compared to six private-
sector companies in the U.S. that carried AAA rating in early 2010. 83% of the mortgage securities rated AAA in 
2006 were ultimately downgraded (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). 
4 
 
typically used for bond classification (Bongaerts et al., 2012). However, since the Lehman 
Brothers index started including Fitch as a third rating agency for assessing the rating 
classifications of bonds in 2005, the rating of a bond has been determined by the middle rating 
provided by the three CRAs (Chen, Lookman, Schürhoff and Seppi, 2014; Chen and Wang, 2017). 
Similarly, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) guidelines require that the 
second lowest rating is used for bond classification when multiple ratings are available (Hanley 
and Nikolova, 2018). Consequently, issuers have an incentive to seek a third rating when there is 
a disagreement between Moody’s and S&P, as obtaining a third rating that is better essentially 
presents the issuer with an opportunity to improve its average rating. In this way, Fitch acts as a 
tiebreaker - if it allocates a higher rating than the lowest rating assigned by either agency, the 
issuer’s average rating increases otherwise, the issuer’s rating remains unchanged. Cantor and 
Packer (1995) observe that this option like payoff increases the demand for a third rating as the 
issuer’s ratings from Moody’s and S&P approach investment grade (IG). Bongaerts et al. (2012) 
find that issuers are twice as likely to seek a Fitch rating for bond issues where Moody’s and S&P 
ratings are on opposite sides of the high yield (HY) - IG boundary and where a third rating provided 
by Fitch helps to differentiate between the bond’s HY and IG status. Furthermore,  Mählmann 
(2009) shows that the increased demand for Fitch ratings is not random but stems from an 
anticipated favorable rating outcome, and the corresponding increase in the average rating of the 
issuer. The systematic issuance of more optimistic ratings by Fitch is widely documented (see, for 
example, Cantor and Packer, 1997; Jewell and Livingston, 1999; Livingston and Zhou, 2016) and 
is consistent with Fitch playing a strategic role to extract compensation for pushing bonds into the 
IG classification when Moody’s and S&P disagree (Bongaerts et al., 2012). 
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Maintaining a bond’s IG status is an important consideration for issuers as many banks and 
insurance firms are mandated by prudential regulations to hold higher reserve capital for HY bonds 
while pension and mutual fund investment mandates typically limit the share of HY securities in 
their portfolios (Baghai, Becker and Pitschner, 2018; Bongaerts et al., 2012). The reduced investor 
base for HY securities significantly affects firms’ capital structure decisions and the cost of 
borrowing associated with rating changes across the HY-IG boundary (Kisgen 2006, 2009). In 
spite of the prior studies on multiple ratings, there is scant evidence on how the reduced rating 
reliance on ratings recommended by Dodd-Frank affects the demand for third ratings and ratings 
accuracy.  
The Dodd-Frank Act presented a series of regulatory reforms to the credit rating industry. 
Specifically, under Section 932 of Dodd-Frank, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
has the power to suspend or revoke a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization 
(NRSRO)’s registration regarding a particular class of securities if their ratings are inaccurate. 
Section 933 lessens the pleading standards for private actions against CRAs, while section 939 
requires federal agencies to remove regulatory reliance on credit ratings and to make appropriate 
substitutions using alternative measures of creditworthiness. In particular, agencies do not need to 
rely exclusively on external credit ratings to determine whether a security is ‘investment grade’.2 
Those sections, which are arguably the most significant provisions within Dodd-Frank regarding 
the regulatory use of credit ratings, have had the largest impact on CRAs. Becker and Opp (2014) 
and Hanley and Nikolova (2018) document that removing credit ratings from capital regulations 
by NAIC affects insurers’ behavior. Dimitrov, Palia and Tang (2015) provide evidence that post 
                                                          
2 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), mandated by Dodd-Frank, states that ‘banks may not rely 
exclusively on external credit ratings, but they may continue to use such ratings as part of their determinations. A 




Dodd-Frank CRAs issue lower credit ratings with weaker stock and bond market reactions and 
have a higher incidence of false warnings. Faced with a rating downgrade, Cohn, Rajan and Strobl 
(2018) show that firms are likely to become more strategic about disclosing negative information, 
and CRAs respond by screening more intensively. Ahmed, Wang and Xu (2017) show that CRAs 
have shifted their focus from qualitative to quantitative information to form their ratings post 
Dodd-Frank to minimize the threat of litigation.  
We conjecture that eliminating the regulatory reliance on credit ratings and increasing the 
legal and regulatory penalties for issuing overly optimistic ratings reduce the appeal of obtaining 
a third rating. Since a third rating is generally provided by Fitch whose ratings are on average more 
optimistic than ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P3, we anticipate a significant reduction in the 
demand for Fitch ratings after the passage of Dodd-Frank. Moreover, we expect that the reduced 
demand for Fitch ratings will translate to these ratings exerting a lower market impact when they 
act as a tiebreaker around the HY-IG boundary.  
By providing ratings, CRAs also serve as external monitors of firms as their rating 
processes involve meetings with management, close examination of managerial ability and 
corporate governance (Jorion, Liu and Shi, 2005; Bonsall, Koharki and Neamtiu, 2016). Previous 
studies show that by having access to firms’ management, information intermediaries such as 
financial analysts and rating agencies help to uncover managers’ private information and detect 
managers’ misbehavior (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Yu (2008) shows that firms with a higher level 
of equity analyst coverage tend to engage in less earnings management. Similarly, firms rated by 
fewer agencies are subject to less scrutiny and can potentially disclose less information. Hence, 
                                                          
3 Most large U.S. corporate bond issues are rated by Moody’s and S&P, with Fitch typically providing the third rating 




we hypothesize that firms without a third rating after Dodd-Frank are less transparent and manage 
their earnings more. Since Li, Griffin, Yue and Zhao (2013) show that greater earnings discretion 
is likely to promote corporate risk taking, we posit that firms engaging in more earnings 
management are more risk-seeking and thus have higher cash flow and sales volatilities.  
Using a database of newly issued U.S. corporate bonds from 2006 to 2015, we show that 
firms are 17.3% less likely to seek a third rating for newly issued bonds following the passage of 
Dodd-Frank. These results strengthen with time as the uncertainty regarding the implementation 
of Dodd-Frank gradually resolves. We further show that post Dodd-Frank, third ratings are less 
informative, having a more muted impact on credit spreads at issuance when firms’ existing 
Moody’s and S&P ratings straddle the HY-IG boundary. Last, we find that the reduced demand 
for third ratings significantly reduces corporate monitoring and harms the financial information 
environment. Firms without a third rating display more earnings management after Dodd-Frank 
with 1.1% higher absolute discretionary accruals and approximately 1% (2.8%) higher cash flow 
(sales) volatility than firms with a third rating.  
Our paper makes several contributes to the current literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature that examines the demand for and market impact of multiple ratings (see, for example, 
Chen and Wang, 2017; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Livingston and Zhou, 2016). The existence of 
multiple ratings is closely related to the competitive environment in the ratings industry, which 
has been linked to the quality of ratings. Some studies view competition as beneficial to improve 
the quality and reliability of ratings (Doherty, Kartasheva and Phillips, 2012; Xia, 2014; Bongaerts 
et al., 2012; Rabanal and Rud, 2017) while others show that increased competition may not 
necessarily improve the information content of credit ratings (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009; Bolton, 
Freixas and Shapiro, 2012) or could even lead to a reduction in rating quality (see Becker and 
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Milbourn, 2011; Flynn and Ghent, 2017; Baghai and Becker, forthcoming). We provide new 
empirical evidence on the weakening of competition in the credit ratings industry post Dodd-Frank 
via a reduced demand for Fitch ratings.  
Second, our paper contributes to the literature that explores the impact of information 
intermediaries on management behavior. Similar to papers that focus on equity analysts’ role to 
uncover managers’ superior information and detect managers’ misbehavior (Yu, 2008; To, Navone 
and Wu, 2018), we show that rating agencies also provide an external monitoring role. Our results 
show that a reduction in external monitoring provided by multiple rating agencies leads to 
increased managerial misbehavior and a deterioration in the quality of the corporate information 
environment. 
Last, we contribute to the growing body of research on the effect of Dodd-Frank on CRAs. 
Current studies highlight the unintended negative consequences of Dodd-Frank on the accuracy of 
credit ratings (Dimitrov et al., 2015); the quality of the information environment (Ederington, Goh, 
Lee and Yang, 2018) and the use of qualitative information in forming a rating opinion (Ahmed et 
al., 2017). Our findings have important policy implications. We extend this line of recent research, 
showing that although Dodd-Frank appears to be achieving its intended objective by reducing the 
demand for ratings especially from smaller players such as Fitch, it has an unintended consequence 
on competition within the ratings industry, and the quality of the information environment. Our 
research points to the need to ensure that other mechanisms be introduced to preserve the quality 
of the information environment as the diminished use of credit ratings becomes binding. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature 
and formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 and 4 describes the methodology and data, respectively 
while Section 5 presents the empirical tests. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Related Studies and Hypotheses Development 
 
Extant studies show that the demand for multiple ratings is primarily driven by financial 
regulation. Opp, Opp and Harris (2013) develop a theoretical framework to show that the 
regulatory reliance on credit ratings lowers ratings quality as CRAs find it more profitable to 
facilitate regulatory arbitrage than to sell informative ratings. Furthermore, Cornaggia, Cornaggia 
and Simin (2016) demonstrate that biased ratings are driven not only by regulatory arbitrage as 
predicted by Opp et al. (2013) but also the conflict of interest inherent in the issuer-pays 
compensation structure. They provide evidence that Moody’s facilitates regulatory arbitrage by 
certifying riskier bonds as IG when S&P has not. Maintaining a bond issue’s IG status has 
significant implications for issuers. For instance, financial firms investing in HY debt may need to 
hold additional capital under ratings contingent capital regulation and investment funds often have 
mandates that either restrict or entirely prohibit investments in HY debt. Kisgen (2006, 2009) and 
Kisgen and Strahan (2010) show that rating changes across the HY-IG boundary significantly 
affect firm’s capital structure decisions, leverage ratios and their cost of debt. Bongaerts et al. 
(2012) find that issues where Fitch assigns an IG credit rating are associated with a 41 basis points 
(bps) lower spread on average than issues where Fitch allocates a HY rating. These studies provide 
support for the regulatory certification hypothesis.  
Baghai et al. (2018) analyze the private use of credit ratings in investment mandates and 
find that the use of credit ratings in fixed income mandates has not declined. However, they do not 
focus on the role of multiple ratings and the regulatory use of ratings post Dodd-Frank. Specifically, 
since Dodd-Frank increases the legal and regulatory penalties for issuing inaccurate ratings and 
eliminates the reliance of financial institutions on credit ratings to quantify minimum capital 
requirements, it reduces the regulatory advantage of higher ratings (Opp et al., 2013; Cornaggia et 
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al., 2016). In related literature, de Haan (2017) finds that market participants already decreased 
their reliance on corporate ratings after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis due to the reputational 
concerns with CRAs. Consequently, we posit that the incentive to inflate ratings (by seeking a 
third rating) should dissipate following the passage of Dodd-Frank leading to a lower demand for 
third ratings.  
H1: The prevalence of firms seeking third ratings has declined post-Dodd Frank. 
Credit ratings have long been shown to have significant information content for market 
participants. Livingston and Zhou (2016) find that a third rating provided by Fitch brings additional 
information to investors and reduces the yield premium on information-opaque bonds by about 
30%, or 15 bps. Cornaggia, Cornaggia and Israelsen (2018) focus on the municipal bond market 
which is dominated by unregulated retail investors and find that investors continue to rely on credit 
ratings for information about credit risk beyond any regulatory implications. Moreover, Bruno, 
Cornaggia and Cornaggia (2016) suggest that the reduced regulatory reliance on CRAs may 
improve the quality of issuer-paid ratings. These studies suggest that despite Section 939 of the 
Dodd Frank Act reducing the regulatory reliance on credit ratings, Dodd Frank remains unlikely 
to extinguish the role of CRAs in determining firms’ creditworthiness. 
Nonetheless, Dimitrov et al. (2015) provide evidence to indicate that CRAs issue lower 
credit ratings following Dodd-Frank and these rating announcements induce weaker stock and 
bond market reactions and exhibit a higher frequency of false warnings. These results suggest that 
Dodd-Frank reduces ratings inflation from the 1970s4 SEC’s regulatory reform documented by 
                                                          
4 In June 1975, the SEC expanded the use of ratings in rules and regulations by issuing new rules that established bank 
and broker-dealer capital requirements based specifically on ratings (Rule 15c3-1), and they also increased the barriers 
to entry in the ratings industry thereby reducing competition within the credit ratings industry (Behr et al., 2016). 
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Behr, Kisgen and Taillard (2016) that restricted competition within the ratings industry and the 
increased regulatory reliance on ratings. Since the increased penalties on false ratings and the 
removal of the reliance on credit ratings may lead to less optimistic ratings and remove the 
advantage of higher ratings, we posit that Dodd-Frank has reduced the information content of third 
ratings. It follows that this would increase borrowing costs for firms, particularly those with 
existing ratings straddling the HY-IG boundary.  
H2: The market reaction to a third rating from Fitch has significantly weakened around 
the HY-IG boundary. 
The muted focus on credit rating signals within financial markets arising from the Dodd 
Frank reform may also have implications for the financial informational environment. Healy and 
Palepu (2001) suggest that information intermediaries such as equity analysts and rating agencies 
act as external monitors to restrain managers’ misbehavior. Using multiple measures of earnings 
management, Yu (2008) finds that firms with greater equity analyst coverage tend to have less 
issues with earnings management. Similarly, Irani and Oesch (2013) examine analysts’ monitoring 
role and document that a higher number of analysts is correlated with higher financial reporting 
quality. To et al. (2018) find that analysts’ monitoring role ensures that managers will undertake 
the most productive projects, therefore greater analyst coverage leads to higher total factor 
productivity within firms. Similar to equity analysts, credit rating agencies also serve as external 
monitors. The credit rating process involves regular meetings between credit analysts and the 
issuer’s management team including on-site visits, and ongoing monitoring of the bond issuer 
(Bonsall et al., 2016).  
Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006) were among the first to theoretically ascribe a 
monitoring role played by CRAs, which is most apparent in their credit watch procedures. 
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Empirically, Bannier and Hirsch (2010) examine CRAs’ economic roles by using Moody’s 
watchlist and show that it helps CRAs to supply information to financial markets and gives rise to 
an active monitoring role of CRAs. Morkoetter, Stebler and Westerfeld (2017) examine the benefit 
of additional ratings from an investor’s perspective. They show that CRAs demonstrate more effort 
regarding their monitoring activities in instances where there are multiple ratings as compared to 
single-rated tranches in the U.S. RMBS market. Cohn et al. (2018) construct a theoretical model 
to also show that issuers can manipulate information obtained by CRAs to induce a favorable 
rating. With potential access to private information from the firm’s management team, credit 
analysts are well placed to assess corporate governance practices and can restrain managers’ 
misbehavior (Healy and Palepu, 2001). However, with the significantly reduced incentives to 
obtain a third rating post-Dodd Frank, firms are likely to disclose less information. It follows that 
firms engaged in extensive earnings management would have greater managerial discretion, which 
in turn promotes corporate risk-taking (Han et al., 2010; Li et al., 2013). 
H3a: Firms without a third rating exhibit more earnings management post Dodd-Frank. 
 H3b: Firms without a third rating engage in riskier corporate operations which lead to 
higher cash flow and sales volatilities post Dodd-Frank. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Probit Model 
To test the impact of Dodd-Frank on the propensity for firms to demand third ratings, we 
use a probit model. The probit regression can be expressed as a latent variable model: 
𝑌𝑌∗ = 𝑿𝑿𝑻𝑻𝜷𝜷 + 𝜀𝜀  =  𝛽𝛽1 Dodd-Frank + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊=𝟐𝟐 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀                         (2) 
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where 𝜀𝜀~𝑁𝑁(0,1),𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 denotes industry effects and 𝑌𝑌∗ is the latent propensity that a firm has a Fitch 
rating (𝑌𝑌 = 1). The vector of the coefficients 𝜷𝜷 is estimated by Maximum Likelihood.  
Specifically, we regress the latent variable Fitch on a Dodd-Frank indicator variable and 
numerous bond and firm characteristics commonly quoted in the literature. Variable definitions 
are listed in Appendix A. We winsorize all continuous firm-level variables at the 1% level in both 
tails of the distribution. Consistent with prior studies, we use size to proxy firm maturity as it has 
been shown to be positively related to the likelihood of having a Fitch rating (Cantor and Packer, 
1997; Bongaerts et al., 2012). Older firms are more inclined to participate in the public bond 
market, and in turn demand a Fitch rating. Opaque firms with high information asymmetry are 
harder to value, so Fitch ratings provide additional information that is priced by the market 
(Livingston, Naranjo and Zhou, 2007; Livingston and Zhou, 2016). We use the Market to Book 
and Intangible Assets as accounting proxies of opacity. Other firm characteristics include Leverage, 
Profitability, and PPE. Firms with higher intangible assets, leverage and profitability may be 
associated with greater firm uncertainty, which is positively related to the likelihood of having a 
Fitch rating (Cantor and Packer, 1997). We supplement these with two opinion-based proxies for 
firm opacity, dispersion in equity analysts’ earnings forecasts, Stdev of Forecasts, and the number 
of analysts following a firm, Analyst Coverage. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Yu (2008) 
show that large analyst coverage promotes more information flows to investors, which improves 
corporate transparency. We also employ a dispersion indicator variable that takes a value of one 
when there is a split rating between Moody’s and S&P, as an additional credit-based opacity proxy. 
Since issues in which Fitch is the tiebreaker CRA are about twice as likely to get a Fitch rating, 
we also control for Distance which is the absolute distance from the HY-IG boundary. 
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3.2 Linear Regression 
We estimate the impact of a Fitch rating on credit spreads, earnings management and 
corporate risk-taking using the following OLS regression: 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽1 Dodd-Frank + 𝛽𝛽2 Fitch + 𝛽𝛽3 Dodd-Frank*Fitch + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊=𝟐𝟐 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 
Where Y indicates alternatively, credit spreads at issuance, earnings management (i.e. absolute 
discretionary accruals) and corporate risk taking (i.e. cash flow volatility and sales volatility), 
respectively, which are explained in detail in the following sections. 
In addition to the bond and firm characteristics mentioned above, to test the impact of 
Dodd-Frank implementation on credit spreads, we also control for CDS index values (CDX Index) 
since higher index values indicate lower overall credit quality in the aggregate credit market which 
typically increases credit spreads at issuance. In the OLS regression on earnings management, we 
follow previous studies (e.g. Yu, 2008) and use the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ADA) 
as the proxy for earnings management (estimation details are described in Appendix B). We 
include Altman Z-scores to account for corporate credit risk since firms close to violating their 
debt covenants or are under financial distress have greater incentives to increase reported earnings 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). We also include Sales Growth and Crash Risk to control for the 
firms’ strong growth and volatilities (Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki and Penn Jr, 2013). In the OLS 
regression on corporate risk-taking, we follow John, Litov and Yeung (2008), Dichev and Tang 
(2009), and Li et al. (2013) and proxy corporate risk-taking activities with firms’ cash flow 
volatility, Cash Flow Vol, and sales volatility, Sales Vol. In addition to other firm characteristics 
(e.g. monitoring by institutional investors and idiosyncratic volatility), we also control for the 
average cash flow volatility or sales volatility of firms from the same industry to capture industry 
norms following Zhang (2009). 
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3.3 Propensity Score Matching 
To address the potential selection bias when comparing firms with third ratings to those 
without, we use a propensity score matching approach to incorporate the probability of seeking a 
third rating (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The propensity score is computed using Firm Size, 
Market to Book, Leverage, Intangible Assets, Profitability, PPE, Analyst Coverage, S&P Ratings 
as well as year and industry fixed effects. We match firms with and without a third rating using 
one-to-one nearest neighbor with replacement based on propensity scores, calculate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and test the statistical significance using the t-test. 
4. Data  
4.1 Sample Selection 
Bond characteristics and credit ratings by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are acquired from the 
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). In line with Dimitrov et al. (2015), our sample 
begins in January 2006 to avoid any ongoing market adjustments following the 2002 Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Act5 and ends in December 2015. Following convention, ratings are converted to 
numerical rating scores, from 1 to 21 (AAA to C for S&P and Aaa to C for Moody’s), with lower 
numbers indicating a better rating. We restrict our sample to senior unsecured newly issued U.S. 
domestic corporate bonds rated by both Moody’s and S&P. Bonds with special features such as 
Yankee bonds, putable bonds, exchangeable bonds, preferred stocks, asset-backed bonds, 
convertible bonds, zero-coupon bonds, bonds with non-fixed coupons and bonds with credit 
                                                          
5 On 25 July, 2002, the Senate and the House passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. Section 702 (b) of SOX requires 
SEC to study the role and function of CRAs (Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009). In response to the requirements, the SEC 
issued a series of reports regarding the role of CRAs and the U.S. Congress conducted a series of hearings (Cheng and 
Neamtiu, 2009). As a result, the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2006, which introduces competition in 
the ratings industry and increases oversight of CRAs, was signed into law by the President.   
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enhancements are excluded. We focus on initial bond ratings at issue as the process for assigning 
initial ratings is more robust than the process for monitoring ratings (Chen and Wang, 2017).  
Accounting information and financial variables are sourced from Compustat. Equity 
analysts’ forecasts and analyst coverage are acquired from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate 
System (IBES). To calculate the standard deviation in earnings forecasts, issuing firms covered by 
fewer than three stock analysts are eliminated. Institutional ownership data is sourced from 
Thomson Reuters 13F Database. Data from different databases are merged using CUSIPs. Credit 
Default Swap (CDS) index values from the North American Investment Grade CDS (CDX NA IG) 
index are obtained from Bloomberg. Firm stock returns are obtained from CRSP. 
4.2 Statistical Description 
We start with 3,502 newly issued domestic bonds that are rated by both Moody’s and S&P 
within the first 30 days after issuance with complete data in Compustat and IBES databases. We 
exclude bond issues with missing data in Mergent FISD, and filter out subsequent bond issues of 
the same issuing firm within the same month. The final sample contains 1,283 bond issues from 
2006 to 2015. Panel A in Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the control variables before 
and after Dodd-Frank and shows that both samples are quite similar. It can be observed that the 
average credit quality of bonds issued after Dodd-Frank is generally lower, which is consistent 
with the issuance of more conservative ratings following the passage of Dodd-Frank to protect 
CRAs’ reputation in response to the increased legal and regulatory penalties for issuing inaccurate 
ratings as documented by Dimitrov et al. (2015). In Table 2, the industry sample distribution (based 
on Mergent Industry code and GICS classification) before and after Dodd-Frank are also 
comparable. In Panel B, we split the sample into firms rated by both Moody’s and S&P that also 
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have a Fitch rating versus firms that do not. It can be seen that firms rated by Fitch have a tendency 
to be generally larger firms, with a higher market-to-book ratio, have more intangible assets, less 
debt, higher profitability and greater analyst coverage.  
[Insert Table 1, 2 about here] 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Demand for Third Ratings 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows the proportion of newly issued un-rated bonds between 2006 
and 2015, and bonds rated by all three CRAs within the first 30 days after issuance, respectively. 
Figure 3 further requires that the bonds are rated by Moody’s and S&P (i.e. the denominator is the 
number of bonds that are rated by both Moody’s and S&P), and plots the proportion of those that 
are also rated by Fitch. There are two clear trends observable in these three figures. First, there are 
more bonds that seek a third rating between 2006 and 2009, which is in line with the increased 
demand for third ratings from the Lehman Brothers index rule change reported by Chen and Wang 
(2017). Second, after the removal of the regulatory reliance on ratings by Dodd Frank, the 
proportion of un-rated firms increases, and the proportion of firms rated by all three CRAs 
decreases. Figure 3 shows that prior to the introduction of Dodd-Frank around 50% of those un-
rated bonds additionally seek a Fitch rating, however, since the passage of Dodd-Frank the 
proportion has decreased to around 25%. These results are consistent with our first hypothesis 
regarding the reduced demand for Fitch ratings with the weakened regulatory reliance on credit 
rating information. 




Table 3 provides the results of probit regressions for the likelihood of getting a Fitch rating 
on the Dodd-Frank dummy and firm controls (equation 2). Consistent with previous figures, firms 
are 17.3% less likely to demand a Fitch rating following the implementation of the Dodd-Frank 
reform. The coefficient is significant at the 1% level. We find that Firm Size is positive and 
significant while Distance is negative and significant. Both coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The results are in line with Bongaerts et al. (2012) who show that large firms and 
firms with current ratings near the HY-IG boundary are more likely to have Fitch ratings. Leverage 
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, which is consistent with the earlier findings 
of Cantor and Packer (1997). Other control variables appear to be less important. Since Fitch is 
more likely to rate utilities and financial firms than other industrial firms (Cantor and Packer, 1997), 
Model 3 re-estimates the probit regressions by excluding these sectors from the sample. The results 
are qualitatively similar.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
As a robustness check, in Table 4, we follow Dimitrov et al. (2015) and re-define the post-Dodd-
Frank period to start in July 2009 (the first version of the legislation), December 2009 (the revised 
version of the legislation), July 2010 (the law’s passage date), July 2012 (Section 939 effective 
date) and Jan 2013 (OCC rule effective date). Strikingly, we find that the results strengthen as the 
uncertainty regarding the passage of Dodd-Frank gradually resolves. The coefficient on Dodd-
Frank monotonically decreases from -0.452 (July 2009) to -0.628 (Jan 2013), which increases our 




In addition, we follow Bongaerts et al. (2012) and expand our study to encompass all (10,289) 
active bonds between 2006 and 2015. The regression results are reported in Table 5 and the figures 
are reported in Appendix C. These results are qualitatively similar, which lend further support to 
our first hypothesis that firms are less likely to obtain a Fitch rating after the passage of Dodd-
Frank 6. Since competition in the ratings industry and the existence of multiple ratings are closely 
related (Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Bae, Kang and Wang, 2015), our results are also indicative 
of reduced competition in the ratings industry following Dodd-Frank and we conjecture this in 
turn, affects the information efficiency of financial markets.  
[Insert Table 4, 5 about here] 
 
5.2 Market Impact of Third Ratings 
Next, we examine the impact of Fitch ratings on the credit spreads at issuance for bonds 
rated by Moody’s and S&P using OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the at-issuance credit 
spreads, and the main variables are Fitch_Makes_IG (a dummy that equals one if Moody’s and 
S&P are at the boundary and the addition of a Fitch rating moves the bond into the IG category, 
and zero otherwise) and an interaction term, Fitch_Makes_IG with Dodd-Frank. We control for 
firm characteristics, issuer’s credit quality, CDS index values and industry fixed effects. Since 
bonds with different issue-level characteristics issued by the same issuers have different at-
issuance credit spreads, we add back the subsequent bonds made by the same issuers within the 
same month, and control for the issue-level characteristics discussed previously.  
                                                          
6 For robustness we also test issue characteristics identified from the literature to be important determinants such as 
issue size, redeemability, and maturity (see, for example, Cantor and Packer, 1997; Bongaerts et al., 2012). The results 
are qualitatively similar and available upon request. 
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In Table 6, the coefficient on Fitch_Makes_Better (a dummy that equals one if an addition 
of a Fitch rating improves the overall rating of the bond, and zero otherwise) is negative but not 
statistically significant. However, the coefficient on Fitch_Makes_IG is negative and significant 
at the 1% level, which indicates that Fitch reduces credit spreads at issuance when it serves as the 
tiebreaker CRA that changes the HY-IG status. The financial payoff from obtaining a favorable 
rating from Fitch is higher at the HY-IG boundary as firms try to exploit the regulatory ruling. As 
such, firms with Moody’s and S&P ratings on opposite sides of the boundary should display the 
strongest market impact of a new Fitch rating prior to the adoption of Dodd-Frank (Bongaerts et 
al., 2012). However, these effects weaken after the passage of Dodd-Frank, as indicated by the 
coefficient on the interaction term between Fitch_Makes_IG and Dodd-Frank. In terms of the 
economic magnitude, the effects on credit spreads at issuance when Fitch lifts the bonds into the 
IG category halves after Dodd-Frank. All controls have the expected sign and significance level. 
In addition, in unreported regression results, our finding remains unchanged after excluding 
utilities and financial firms.7 
These results provide empirical evidence in support of our hypothesis that the market 
impact of Fitch ratings on credit spread changes diminishes following the adoption of Dodd-Frank 
and is consistent with the weakened stock and bond market reaction documented by Dimitrov et 
al. (2015). Our empirical evidence supports the theoretical predictions made by Opp et al. (2013). 
Specifically, the reduced regulatory reliance on credit ratings enforced by Dodd-Frank and the 
removal of the associated regulatory advantage in having higher third ratings has led to a 
significant reduction in the market impact of Fitch ratings at the investment grade boundary. 
                                                          
7 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5.3 Opaqueness, Earnings Management and Corporate Risk-Taking 
In this section, we examine the ramifications for the quality of the financial information 
environment and investigate whether firms without Fitch ratings manage their earnings more. 
Panel A in Table 7 reports the average ADA for firms with and without Fitch ratings before and 
after Dodd-Frank. The unmatched results show that after Dodd-Frank, firms without Fitch ratings 
manage their earnings more (i.e. 0.8% higher in ADA) and the difference is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Next, to resolve the selection bias when comparing firms with third ratings to those 
without, we match firms without a third rating (treatment group) with those with a third rating 
(control) using one-to-one nearest neighbor matching in terms of propensity scores ensuring that 
the control firm can be as similar as possible to the treated firm based on the characteristics listed 
in Section 3.3. As shown in Panel A, after careful matching, we continue to find that firms without 
Fitch ratings are associated with more earnings management post Dodd-Frank compared to those 
with Fitch ratings. Specifically, the difference between treated and control bond issuing firms in 
ADA is 1.1% (of the total assets at the beginning of the period) and is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. To rule out the possibility that the results are driven by other factors, we run 
additional regressions for ADA after controlling for variables that are associated with earnings 
management8. The results, which are reported in Table 8, do not change our conclusion - the 
interaction terms between Dodd-Frank and Without Fitch is positive and statistically significant at 
                                                          
8 Besides the variables described in Table 1, the statistics for other variables that affect earnings management and 
corporate risk-taking are reported in Appendix D. 
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the 5% level, which indicates that the sample firms without Fitch ratings have more earnings 
management after Dodd-Frank9.  
Our results support prior studies showing that information intermediaries act as external 
monitors on managers and play an important role in effective corporate governance. Specifically, 
the empirical evidence complements previous studies on equity analysts’ monitoring role (Yu, 
2008; To et al., 2018), and shows that credit analysts can also restrain managers’ misbehavior. In 
addition, Morkoetter et al. (2017) provide evidence that the existence of multiple ratings positively 
affects CRAs’ efforts spent on their monitoring activities in the U.S. RMBS market. Our results 
are consistent with Morkoetter et al. (2017), and further show that the effect is not just confined to 
the RMBS market but is also present in the corporate bond market.  
Since previous studies (e.g. John et al., 2008; Li et al., 2013) show earnings discretion 
and corporate governance are related to firms’ cash flow volatility (a proxy for corporate risk-
taking), we next examine whether firms without Fitch ratings also engage in riskier corporate 
activities that lead to more volatile earnings. Panels B and C in Table 7 show that post Dodd-Frank, 
firms without Fitch ratings exhibit more volatile earnings, and the difference for Cash Flow Vol 
and Sales Vol is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Table 9 shows that 
after controlling for variables affecting earnings volatility, firms without Fitch ratings in the post-
Dodd Frank era have 1% (2.8%) higher cash flow (sales) volatility, compared to firms still with 
Fitch ratings. Overall, the results are consistent with previous studies linking firms’ earnings 
discretion activities to their corporate risk-taking activities. This indicates an unintended 
consequence from the Dodd Frank regulatory reform. The reduced market demand for third ratings 
                                                          
9 As robustness, we also run regression using balanced (matched) data and the results are qualitatively similar. In 
addition, the regression is re-examined after excluding utilities and financials. The results are qualitatively similar and 
available upon request. 
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ensuing from the increased legal and regulatory penalties for issuing inaccurate ratings and the 
muted reliance on credit ratings, has fostered more corporate risk taking and compromised the 
integrity of the corporate information environment. 
[Insert Tables 7, 8, 9 about here] 
6. Conclusion 
The Dodd-Frank reform enacted in response to the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis 
introduced several important reforms to the credit rating industry. These include increased legal 
and regulatory penalties for issuing inaccurate ratings, and the elimination of the regulatory 
reliance on credit ratings by financial institutions in determining capital adequacy ratios. We 
present evidence that these changes materially impacted the activities of the credit rating industry. 
Using newly issued U.S. bond ratings over the years from 2006 to 2015, we find that firms are less 
likely to seek a third rating for newly issued bonds following the implementation of Dodd-Frank. 
Third rating assessments typically provided by Fitch, have become less informative with a 
diminished impact on credit spreads post Dodd-Frank when firms with current Moody’s and S&P 
ratings are on opposite sides of the investment grade (HY-IG) boundary. Strikingly, we find that 
firms without third ratings provided by Fitch in the post-Dodd-Frank era manage earnings more 
and have higher cash flow and sales volatilities, suggesting that they engage in greater corporate 
risk taking. Our results suggest that the increased legal and regulatory penalties for issuing 
inaccurate ratings and the reduced regulatory reliance on credit ratings has extinguished the 
advantage of having Fitch ratings and this has in turn significantly diminished the market impact 
of Fitch ratings. However, our findings suggest that a reduction in the external monitoring 
previously provided by multiple CRAs may inadvertently increase managerial misbehavior and 
incentivize corporate risk-taking. Overall, these developments may compromise the quality of the 
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corporate information environment. Future research in this area should focus on whether this 
reduction in external monitoring by rating agencies may also affect corporate policies and exert 
real economic effects. Our research provides an important first step in linking the recent regulatory 
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Figure 1 Proportion of un-rated newly issued bonds 
This figure plots the proportion of newly issued bonds between 2006 and 2015 that are un-rated within the first 30 
days after issuance. Bonds with special features such as Yankee bonds, putable bonds, exchangeable bonds, preferred 
stocks, asset-backed bonds, convertible bonds, zero-coupon bonds, bonds with non-fixed coupon and bonds with credit 
enhancements are excluded. Subsequent bond issues of the same issuing firm within the same month are also filtered 
out. 
 
Figure 2 Proportion of newly issued bonds with three ratings 
This figure plots the proportion of newly issued bonds between 2006 and 2015 that are rated by all three CRAs within 
the first 30 days after issuance.  
 
Figure 3 Proportion of newly issued bonds rated by Fitch 
This figure plots the proportion of newly issued bonds between 2006 and 2015 rated by Moody’s and S&P within the 




Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables Affecting Fitch Demand 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for all control variables that influence the demand for Fitch ratings. The sample contains newly issued domestic bonds 
with complete data in Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT and IBES between Jan 2006 and Dec 2015. In Panel A, the sample is partitioned into Before and After Dodd-
Frank subsample periods. The period prior to (following) Dodd-Frank is defined as January 2, 2006 to July 21, 2010 (July 22, 2010 to December 31, 2015). Panel 
B partitions data into Without-Fitch and With-Fitch subsamples. The whole sample includes all newly issued bonds that were rated by both Moody’s or S&P within 
the first 30 days after issuance. The Without-Fitch and With-Fitch subsamples include bonds with no Fitch ratings and with Fitch ratings, respectively.  
 
 
Panel B Mean Median 
 Whole Sample Without Fitch With Fitch Whole Sample Without Fitch With Fitch 
Firm Size 10.244 10.202 10.303 9.982 9.749 10.232 
Market to Book 1.532 1.515 1.557 1.341 1.303 1.359 
Intangible Assets 0.178 0.172 0.188 0.116 0.099 0.131 
Leverage 0.276 0.292 0.254 0.249 0.259 0.235 
Profitability 0.040 0.035 0.048 0.034 0.027 0.045 
PPE 0.502 0.488 0.523 0.370 0.328 0.427 
Analyst Coverage 22.019 21.584 22.636 21 20 22 
Stdev of Forecasts 0.026 0.032 0.017 0.004 0.0046 0.003 
Rating Dispersion 0.675 0.704 0.634 1 1 0 
S&P Ratings 8.227 8.468 7.885 8 8 8 
#Obs 1283 753 530 1283 753 530 
Panel A Before Dodd-Frank (560 obs)   After Dodd-Frank (723 obs)  
   Mean Median Min Max Std  Mean Median Min Max Std 
Firm Size  10.320 10.136 6.538 13.752 1.966  10.185 9.871 6.538 13.752 1.871 
Market to Book  1.532 1.331 0.892 4.015 0.616  1.533 1.348 0.892 4.015 0.632 
Intangible Assets  0.173 0.116 0 0.720 0.187  0.182 0.115 0 0.720 0.198 
Leverage  0.272 0.241 0.012 0.711 0.155  0.280 0.252 0.012 0.711 0.147 
Profitability  0.042 0.032 -0.225 0.209 0.060  0.039 0.035 -0.225 0.209 0.064 
PPE  0.468 0.336 0 1.761 0.428  0.529 0.414 0 1.761 0.462 
Analyst Coverage  19.346 19 3 43 8.337  24.089 24 3 62 10.982 
Stdev of Forecasts  0.0453 0.004 0.000 1.436 0.217  0.011 0.004 0 0.686 0.034 
S&P Ratings  6.991 7 1 17 3.761  9.184 9 1 18 3.222 
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Table 2. Industry Distribution 
This table presents the industry distribution of the sample before and after Dodd-Frank. Panel A is based on the Mergent industry code while Panel B is based on 
the GICS classification. 
Panel A Before Dodd-Frank After Dodd-Frank 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Industrial 359 64.11% 488 67.50% 
Finance 137 24.46% 166 22.96% 
Utility 28 5.00% 59 8.16% 
Government 36 6.43% 10 1.38% 
Total 560 100% 723 100% 
 
 
Panel B Before Dodd-Frank After Dodd-Frank 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Energy 61 10.89% 109 15.08% 
Materials 49 8.75% 56 7.75% 
Industrials 99 17.68% 64 8.85% 
Consumer Discretionary 52 9.29% 87 12.03% 
Consumer Staples 51 9.11% 48 6.64% 
Health Care 60 10.71% 75 10.37% 
Financials 126 22.50% 149 20.61% 
IT 23 4.11% 53 7.33% 
Telecommunication 13 2.32% 29 4.01% 
Utilities 24 4.29% 47 6.50% 
Real Estate 2 0.36% 6 0.83% 
Total 560 100% 723 100% 
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Table 3. Fitch Demand: Probit Regressions of Fitch Rating 
This table reports the results of probit regressions with a Fitch rating on the Dodd-Frank dummy and firm controls 
between Jan 2006 and Dec 2015. Standard errors are clustered by firms to account for multiple bond issues made by 
the same firm. Z-values are shown inside brackets. Model 1 reports the results for probit regressions after controlling 
for industry fixed effects, while Model 2 reports the marginal effects. Model 3 reports the results for probit regressions 
after excluding utilities and financial firms.  ***, **, * represent significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile 
levels, respectively. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES Probit Marginal Effects Probit 
     
Dodd-Frank -0.507*** -0.173*** -0.375*** 
 (-5.187)  (-3.551) 
Firm Size 0.170*** 0.057*** 0.238*** 
 (2.740)  (2.844) 
Intangible Assets -0.524 -0.177 -0.772 
 (-1.158)  (-1.539) 
Market to Book -0.118 -0.040 -0.141 
 (-0.948)  (-1.107) 
Leverage -1.012** -0.342** -0.993 
 (-2.000)  (-1.534) 
Profitability 0.742 0.251 0.155 
 (0.676)  (0.130) 
PPE 0.437 0.148 0.235 
 (1.476)  (0.734) 
Analyst Coverage -0.003 -0.001 0.010 
 (-0.317)  (1.175) 
Stdev of Forecasts 0.124 0.042 -0.370 
 (0.308)  (-0.250) 
Rating Dispersion -0.097 -0.033 -0.042 
 (-1.203)  (-0.532) 
Distance -0.133*** -0.045*** -0.155*** 
 (-4.037)  (-4.185) 
Constant -1.286*  -2.028** 
 (-1.927)  (-2.395) 
    
Industry FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,283  937 











Table 4. Probit Regressions of Fitch Rating for Pseudo-events 
This table reports the results of probit regressions for a Fitch rating on the Dodd-Frank dummy and firm controls 
between Jan 2006 and Dec 2015, conditional on the starting date of the post-Dodd-Frank period. For brevity the 
coefficients on the control variables are omitted. Standard errors are clustered by firms to account for multiple bond 
issues made by the same firm. Z-values are shown inside brackets.  Following Dimitrov et al. (2015) we re-define the 
post-Dodd-Frank to start in July 2009 (the first version of the legislation), Dec 2009 (i.e. the revised version of the 
legislation), July 2010 (i.e. the law’s passage date), July 2012 (i.e. Section 939 effective date) and Jan 2013 (i.e. OCC 
rule effective date). ***, **, * represent significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile levels, respectively. 
 
 




VARIABLES Jul-09 Dec-09 Jul-10 Jul-12 Jan-13 
       
Dodd-Frank -0.452*** -0.461*** -0.507*** -0.573*** -0.628*** 
 (-4.413) (-4.787) (-5.187) (-5.169) (-5.111) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




















Table 5. Probit Regressions of Fitch Ratings on Active Bonds 
This table re-examines the effect in Table 3 by running probit regressions of a Fitch rating on the Dodd-Frank dummy 
and firm controls on active bonds between Jan 2006 and Dec 2015. Standard errors are clustered by firms to account 
for multiple bond issues made by the same firm. Z-values are shown inside brackets. Model 1 reports the results for 
probit regression, while Model 2 reports the marginal effects. ***, **, * represent significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 
10th percentile levels, respectively. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES Probit Marginal Effects 
      
Dodd-Frank -0.260*** -0.083*** 
 (-4.016)  
Firm size 0.450*** 0.142*** 
 (6.411)  
Intangible Assets -0.650* -0.206* 
 (-1.852)  
Market to Book -0.005 -0.001 
 (-0.527)  
Leverage -0.174 -0.055 
 (-0.444)  
ROA -2.088* -0.661* 
 (-1.767)  
PPE 0.135 0.043 
 (0.667)  
Analyst Coverage 0.002 0.001 
 (0.317)  
Stdev of Forecasts 1.576*** 0.495*** 
 (2.773)  
Rating Dispersion 0.048 0.015 
 (0.949)  
Distance -0.105*** -0.033*** 
 (-3.428)  
Constant -4.327***  
 (-6.656)  
   
Industry FE Yes  
Observations 10,289  








Table 6. OLS Regression of Credit Spreads  
This table reports the results of an OLS regression for credit spreads at issuance on the Fitch dummies, issue 
characteristics and firm controls between Jan 2006 and Dec 2015. Standard errors are clustered by firms to account 
for multiple bond issues made by the same firm. T-statistics are shown inside brackets. ***, **, * represent 
significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 
VARIABLES Credit Spread 

















Firm Size -6.597* 
 (-1.917) 
Market to Book -28.338*** 
 (-4.105) 
Intangible Assets -83.525*** 
 (-4.216) 
Analyst Coverage -1.353*** 
 (-3.600) 




S&P Rating 27.054*** 
 (16.134) 














Table 7. Earnings Management and Corporate Risk-Taking 
This table reports the PSM estimations on absolute discretionary accruals (Panel A), cash flow volatility (Panel B) 
and sales volatility (Panel C), respectively, for firms with/without Fitch ratings before and after Dodd-Frank. The 
propensity scores are computed using firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, intangible assets, profitability, PPE, 
analyst coverage, credit quality as well as year and industry fixed effects. The matching is done using a one-to-one 
nearest neighbor matching with replacement. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is reported and the 
statistical significance is tested using the t-test. ***, **, * represent significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A- ADA Before DFA After DFA 
 Treated Controls ATT t stat Treated Controls ATT t stat 
 (Without Fitch) (With Fitch)     (Without Fitch) (With Fitch)     
Unmatched 0.048 0.045 0.003 0.69 0.041 0.033 0.008** 2.15 
ATT 0.048 0.055 0.007 1.16 0.041 0.03 0.011** 2.09 
 
 
Panel B- Cash Flow Vol Before DFA After DFA 
 Treated Controls ATT t stat Treated Controls ATT t stat 
 (Without Fitch) (With Fitch)     (Without Fitch) (With Fitch)     
Unmatched 0.026 0.025 0.001 0.45 0.034 0.025 0.009*** 2.6 
ATT 0.026 0.023 0.003 0.6 0.034 0.023 0.011*** 2.89 
 
 
Panel C- Sales Vol Before DFA After DFA 
 Treated Controls ATT t stat Treated Controls ATT t stat 
 (Without Fitch) (With Fitch)     (Without Fitch) (With Fitch)     
Unmatched 0.079 0.088 -0.009 -1.10 0.099 0.080 0.019** 2.05 








Table 8. OLS Regression of Fitch Ratings on Earnings Management 
This table reports the results of an OLS regression for absolute discretionary accruals on the Dodd-Frank dummy, 
Without Fitch dummy and firm controls between Jan 2006 and Dec 2015. Without Fitch is a dummy that equals one 
if Fitch has not rated the issue, and zero otherwise. Consistent with Yu (2008), absolute discretionary accruals are 
multiplied by 100 to be presented as a percentage of lagged assets. Standard errors are clustered by firms to account 
for multiple bond issues made by the same firm. T-statistics are shown inside brackets. ***, **, * represent 
significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile levels, respectively. 
 
  Linear Regression 
VARIABLES Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
    




Without Fitch -0.753 
 (-1.609) 
Firm Size -0.082 
 (-0.498) 
Market to Book 0.426 
 (0.856) 








Analyst Coverage 0.001 
 (0.057) 
Analyst Dispersion 8.452*** 
 (6.018) 














Table 9. OLS Regressions of Fitch Ratings on Cash Flow and Sales Volatilities 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for earnings volatility on the Dodd-Frank dummy, Without Fitch 
dummy and firm controls between Jan 2006 and Dec 2015. Model 1 reports the results for cash flow volatility (i.e. 5-
year standard deviation of ROA) while model 2 uses sales volatility (5-year standard deviation of sales (scaled by total 
assets)), consistent with Zhang (2009). Without Fitch is a dummy that equals one if Fitch has not rated the issue, and 
zero otherwise. Consistent with prior studies, the standard deviation of ROA, standard deviation of sales, idiosyncratic 
risk, and industry average volatility are multiplied by 100 to be presented as a percentage. Standard errors are clustered 
by firms to account for multiple bond issues made by the same firm. T-statistics are shown inside brackets. ***, **, * 
represent significance beyond the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES Stdev(ROA) Stdev(Sales) 
      
Dodd-Frank*Without Fitch 0.987** 2.768** 
 (2.461) (2.479) 
Dodd-Frank 0.217 -0.674 
 (0.829) (-0.898) 
Without Fitch -0.415 -1.153 
 (-1.455) (-1.307) 
Firm Size -0.272*** -1.261*** 
 (-2.874) (-4.678) 
Market to Book 0.179 -0.699 
 (0.613) (-0.556) 
Leverage 0.477 -1.821 
 (0.325) (-0.548) 
Profitability 6.977 -12.854 
 (1.475) (-1.244) 
PPE 1.396** -2.246 
 (2.265) (-1.293) 
Z-Score -0.012*** -0.064*** 
 (-4.038) (-4.458) 
Sales Growth 1.648** 14.971*** 
 (2.090) (3.728) 
Idiosyncratic Vol 0.254** 0.340** 
 (2.414) (2.239) 
Institutional Holding 0.460 -0.758 
 (1.439) (-0.854) 
Industry Average 0.002* 0.006* 
 (1.775) (1.946) 
Constant 4.091*** 30.665*** 
 (2.740) (5.683) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,152 1,174 
R-squared 0.224 0.320 
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Appendix A Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Fitch A dummy variable equals one if the bond has a Fitch rating, and zero otherwise MERGENT 
Without Fitch A dummy variable equals one if Fitch has not rated the bond, and zero otherwise MERGENT 
Dodd-Frank A dummy variable equals one if firm’s bond is issued after Dodd-Frank (i.e. 21 July 2010), and zero 
otherwise 
MERGENT 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (in millions) COMPUSTAT 
Market to Book The market-to-book ratio (firm’s market value of equity minus book value of equity plus total assets 
divided by total assets) 
COMPUSTAT 
Intangible Assets Firm’s intangible assets scaled by total assets COMPUSTAT 
Leverage The book value of long-term debt scaled by total assets COMPUSTAT 
Profitability Net income scaled by total assets COMPUSTAT 
PPE Property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets COMPUSTAT 
Analyst Coverage The number of analysts following a firm IBES 
Stdev of Forecasts The standard deviation of forecast annual EPS, scaled by the firm’s stock price IBES 
S&P Ratings An ordinal number ranging from one (for AAA rated bonds) to twenty-one (for C rated bonds) MERGENT 
Moody’s Rating An ordinal number ranging from one (for Aaa rated bonds) to twenty-one (for C rated bonds) MERGENT 
Rating Dispersion The absolute difference between ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P MERGENT 
Distance The absolute distance from the HY-IG boundary. MERGENT 
Credit Spread The difference between the yield of the benchmark treasury issue and the issue's offering yield 
expressed in basis points 
MERGENT 
CDX Index CDS index values (i.e. CDX NA IG index)  BLOOMBERG 
Fitch_Added_Better A dummy that equal equals one if Fitch is added and overall rating level is improved, and zero 
otherwise 
MERGENT 
Fitch_Added_Equal A dummy that equals one if Fitch is added and overall rating level is unchanged (i.e. Fitch cannot 
worsen the overall rating level), and zero otherwise 
MERGENT 
Fitch_Makes_IG A dummy that equals one if Moody’s and S&P are at the boundary and Fitch added and Fitch pulls IG, 
and zero otherwise 
MERGENT 
InvBoundary A dummy that equals one if Moody’s and S&P are at the HY-IG boundary, and zero otherwise MERGENT 
Issue Size Natural logarithm of the offering amount MERGENT 
Maturity Natural logarithm of the maturity (in month) MERGENT 
Redeemable A dummy that equals one if the bond is redeemable, and zero otherwise MERGENT 





Split A dummy variable equals one if Moody’s rating differs from S&P rating, and zero otherwise MERGENT 
ADA The absolute value of discretionary accrual, based on a modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1995) 
COMPUSTAT 
Crash Risk A dummy that equals one if the firm experiences one or more crash weeks in the year, and zero 
otherwise, based on Kim, Li and Zhang (2011) 
CRSP 
Z-score The Altman Z-score, based on Altman, (1968) COMPUSTAT 
Sales Growth The changes in sales, scaled by the lagged assets COMPUSTAT 
Cash Flow Vol The 5-year standard deviation of ROA (i.e. EBITDA/total assets) COMPUSTAT 
Sales Vol The 5-year standard deviation of sales (i.e. sales/total assets) COMPUSTAT 
Industry Average The average cash flow (sales) volatility of firms from the same industry  COMPUSTAT 
Idiosyncratic Vol The one-year standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns, based on Kim et al. (2011) CRSP 




Appendix B. Variable Construction 
- Earnings Management 
We follow Yu (2008) and use a modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), which estimates 
discretionary accruals based on the following cross-sectional model estimated for each two-digit 
SIC-year grouping:  
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝑏𝑏0 � 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝑏𝑏1 �𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 � + 𝑏𝑏2 � 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1)  
Where TA equals net income minus cash flow from operations; ΔSales is the changes in sales 
revenues; PPE is the gross property, plant, and equipment. ΔAR is the changes in receivables; All 
variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period (i.e. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1). 
We use the coefficient estimates from equation (1) to calculate nondiscretionary accruals: 
       𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0�� 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝑏𝑏1� �𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 − 𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 � + 𝑏𝑏2�� 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1�  (2)    
Our measurement of discretionary accruals (as a percentage of the assets of the firm) is the absolute 
value of the difference between total accruals and the nondiscretionary accruals:  





Appendix C. Active Bonds 
Figure 4 Proportion of bonds with three ratings 
This figure plots the proportion of active bonds with three ratings between 2006 and 2015. Bonds with special features 
such as Yankee bonds, putable bonds, exchangeable bonds, preferred stocks, asset-backed bonds, convertible bonds, 
zero-coupon bonds, bonds with non-fixed coupon and bonds with credit enhancements are excluded. Subsequent bond 
issues of the same issuing firm within the same month are also filtered out. 
 
 
Figure 5 Proportion of bonds rated by Fitch 
This figure plots the proportion of active bonds between 2006 and 2015 rated by Moody’s and S&P that also have a 





Appendix D. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Affecting Earnings Management and Corporate Risk-Taking 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for variables (i.e. additional variables besides those listed in Table 1) used 
in Section 4.3.3. The whole sample is partitioned into before Dodd-Frank and after Dodd-Frank subsample periods, 
and each subsample is further partitioned into Without-Fitch and With-Fitch groups.  
 
 
  Before Dodd-Frank  After Dodd-Frank 
  Without Fitch With Fitch  Without Fitch With Fitch 
   Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median Mean Median 
ADA  0.048 0.035 0.045 0.032  0.041 0.026 0.033 0.024 
Cash Flow Vol  0.026 0.014 0.025 0.017  0.034 0.021 0.025 0.019 
Sales Vol  0.079 0.045 0.088 0.062  0.099 0.053 0.080 0.054 
Idiosyncratic Vol  0.050 0.036 0.041 0.036  0.034 0.030 0.030 0.026 
Crash Risk  0.331 0 0.193 0  0.186 0 0.140 0 
Z-Score  1.512 0.927 1.749 1.355  1.528 1.025 4.735 1.512 
Sales Growth  0.046 0.014 0.023 0.011  0.062 0.021 0.042 0.025 
Institutional Holding  0.713 0.741 0.746 0.766  0.704 0.708 0.769 0.730 
Industry Avg CF Vol  1.793 0.330 1.256 0.330  1.280 0.510 0.969 0.478 
Industry Avg Sales Vol  0.416 0.218 0.386 0.240  0.244 0.220 0.200 0.191 
